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This article identifies the part-time wage effect, using hours variation
caused by the social security rules. We show that work hours and
wages drop sharply at ages 62 and 65. We argue that the hours decline
causes the wage decline, resulting in a 25% wage penalty for men
who cut their work week from 40 to 20 hours. However, we find
little evidence for such an effect among women. We also show that
models that fail to account for the joint determination of hours and
wages will understate the labor supply response to a tax change by
about 26%.
I. Introduction
Labor supply models typically assume that a worker receives a fixed
wage offer and chooses the number of hours to work given that wage.
However, the wage offered to workers may be determined by the number
of hours worked by an employee.1
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we show how taxes affect
We thank Kirti Kamboj and Ken Housinger for their great assistance and Dan
Sullivan and Ruilin Zhou for helpful discussions. Our views do not necessarily
reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
Contact the corresponding author, Daniel Aaronson, at daaronson@frbchi.org.
1 See Barzel (1973), Rosen (1976), Moffitt (1984), and Ermisch and Wright (1993)
for descriptions of why wages may vary with hours worked.
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hours worked in a model where hours and wages are jointly determined.
Standard labor supply elasticities measure the relationship between labor
supply and the wage. Tax analysts use these estimated labor supply elas-
ticities to predict the labor supply response to a tax change. However,
tax analysts usually fail to account for the effect of hours worked on the
wage. This failure creates a problem because a tax increase not only lowers
the after-tax wage because of a change in the marginal tax rate but also
indirectly lowers the pre-tax wage through the tax change’s effect on hours
worked. Therefore, failure to account for this latter effect leads to an
underestimate of the effect of tax changes on the post-tax wage and con-
sequently to an underestimate of the effect of tax changes on labor supply.
The second purpose of this article is to provide new estimates of the
effect of work hours on the wage. In order to estimate the effect of hours
worked on the wage, we must overcome an important identification prob-
lem. It is not clear whether changes in hours affect wages or whether
changes in wages affect hours. Previous studies that try to measure the
part-time wage effect often use an instrumental variables strategy that
employs the number of young children in the household and other child-
bearing demographics as instruments for hours worked in samples of
working women.2 Presumably, increases in the number of children cause
reductions in a woman’s work hours. Researchers interpret differences in
wages between women with and without children as resulting from dif-
ferences in work hours. However, this is a valid strategy only if young
children reduce a mother’s available time for work and do not directly
affect her productivity. Furthermore, if young children also restrict the
mother’s job opportunities, perhaps because she needs a flexible work
schedule, then her wages are lower not because she is a part-time worker
but because she faces other work restrictions. This would lead to an
overestimate of the effect of part-time work on wages. Nevertheless, ex-
amples using such instruments result in estimates of the part-time/full-
time wage differential that are all over the board.3
In order to identify the part-time wage differential, we take advantage
of what we believe is a better instrument for hours worked, that is, the
work disincentives of the social security system. At ages 62 and 65, in-
dividuals face incentives to reduce their work hours. During our sample
period, most individuals age 62 and older are eligible for social security
benefits but face an earnings test until age 69. Above the social security
earnings test threshold level, individuals face a high marginal tax rate on
2 Rosen (1976), Moffitt (1984), Simpson (1986), Blank (1990), Hotchkiss (1991),
and Ermisch and Wright (1993) use this strategy. Lundberg (1985) finds that lagged
hours has predictive ability for wages and argues that this predictive power is
evidence in favor of tied wage-hours offers. We are aware of no other identification
strategy.
3 See Blank (1990) for a review.
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earnings. Between ages 62 and 64, benefits lost through the earnings test
are replaced in the form of higher benefits in the future, resulting in about
a dollar of higher benefits in present value in the future for every dollar
lost through the earnings test. However, if individuals are liquidity con-
strained, it may not be until age 62, when the early retirement provision
of the social security rules applies, that they will have sufficient financial
resources to reduce their work hours. After age 65, benefits lost through
the social security earnings test result in only small increases in future
benefits. Therefore, the social security earnings test results in a strong
incentive to reduce work hours by age 65.4
A further reason the social security system provides incentives to reduce
work hours by age 65 is that, for many workers, health insurance is
included with their job. Many individuals who would reduce their work
hours would also lose their health insurance, exposing them to the risk
of facing health problems without insurance. At age 65, all individuals
who are eligible for social security are also eligible for medicare. This
means that most individuals who are age 65 and older have reasonable
quality health insurance even if they lose their employer-provided
insurance.
While we believe that our identification strategy is a useful addition to
the literature, a disadvantage to this approach is that we are working with
the oldest of workers. Therefore, our results are not necessarily repre-
sentative of other populations of workers.
Nevertheless, using these instruments and data from the Health and
Retirement Survey (HRS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
and the Current Population Survey (CPS), we find evidence that male
part-time workers earn lower wages than male full-time workers. De-
pending on the specification and the data employed, our estimates imply
that cutting hours from 40 to 20 hours per week lowers wages by as
much as 25% for men. Many, but certainly not all, of our estimates are
significant at the 10% level or higher, and point estimates are similar across
the different data sets. The point estimates appear to be relatively robust
to attempts to control for confounding factors that might influence
changes in wages at ages 62 and 65. However, the evidence for a part-
time penalty among female workers is weak.
II. Estimating the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution with
Tied Wage-Hours Offers
In this section, we present a standard life cycle labor supply model
augmented to include tied wage-hours offers. Solving the model illumi-
4 For formal evidence, see French (2000).
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nates a fundamental model misspecification problem.5 An increase in the
posttax wage from a tax cut potentially leads to an increase in hours
worked. Additionally, this increase in the work week leads to an increase
in the pretax wage through the tied wage-hours effect, further increasing
hours worked. Therefore, there is a larger labor supply response to a tax
change than to an equally large wage change. Most models do not account
for tied wage-hours offers and thus ignore this latter effect. Therefore,
the model misspecification problem causes tax analysts to understate the
labor supply response to a tax change.
A. The Intertemporal Labor Supply Model
We begin with the canonical intertemporal labor supply model,6 as in
MaCurdy (1985), augmented to account for tied wage-hours offers. Pref-
erences take the form:
T 1(1/j)hittUp E b v(c ) exp ( /j)# , (1)0 it it[ ]1 (1/j)tp1
where U is the expected discounted present value of lifetime utility, iscit
consumption, is some increasing concave function, is hours worked,v(.) hit
and is the person- and year-specific preference for work. The parameterit
j is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is the usual object
of interest in intertemporal labor supply studies. Define as assets,A rit t
as the interest rate, and as the post-tax wage, which potentiallyW (log h )it it
depends on hours worked:
log W (log h )p log w (log h ) log (1 t ), (2)it it it it t
log w (log h )p a  v log h , (3)it it it it
where represents the pre-tax wage, represents an individual’sw (log h ) ait it it
underlying productivity or technology during a specific year, and is thett
tax rate. We assume that the tax rate depends on neither wages nor hours
worked. The function maps work hours into the wage. In one ofv log hit
the few papers that provide a theoretical explanation for the existence of
5 A potential simultaneous equation bias is also present since hours depend on
wages and wages depend on hours worked. Given that an increase in hours results
in an increase in the wage and an increase in the wage results in an increase in hours,
the simultaneous equations bias results in an upward bias for the labor supply
elasticity if the econometrician uses ordinary least squares. However, this bias is
overcome when using the standard instrumental variables procedures.
6 The key results from this section do not depend on whether the model is static
or dynamic. However, the intertemporal model simplifies the analysis because it
allows us to focus more on the substitution effect of a tax change. In static models
and models with liquidity constraints, tax changes cause an additional change in the
marginal utility of wealth.
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tied wage-hours offers, Barzel (1973) suggests that, at low levels of hours
worked, an additional work hour increases the hourly wage because the
fixed costs of work (such as time spent in training) are spread over a
longer work week, that is, 7v 1 0.
Maximization of (1) subject to equations (2) and (3) and the dynamic
budget constraint
A p (1 r )[A W (log h )h  c ] (4)it1 t it it it it it
results in the labor supply function
W (log h )hit it itlog h p j log  j logl   , (5)it it it[ ]hit
where is the marginal utility of wealth.l it
Taking a first-order Taylor’s series approximation around the term
log [1 (h /W )[W (log h /h )],it it it it it
W (log h )h h W (log h )it it it it it itlog p log W (log h ) 1it it[ ] { [ ]}h W hit it it
 log W (log h )it it≈ log W (log h ) . (6)it it[ ] log hit
Noting that
 log W (log h )it it
p v (7)
 log hit
and combining (5), (6), and (7) results in
log h p j log W (log h ) v  j logl   . (8)[ ]it it it it it
The term in square brackets, parameterized by is the logarithm of thej,
opportunity cost of time. The opportunity cost of time has two parts.
The first part arises because of increased income from increases in hours
worked, holding the wage fixed. The second part arises because of in-
creased income from a higher hourly wage when the individual works
more hours. If changes in hours of work do not change the wage, then
and equation (8) becomes the standard estimating equation in in-vp 0
tertemporal labor supply models.
7 If , then the budget set is not convex. However, eq. (5) still represents anv 1 0
equilibrium condition so long as This condition is satisfied for reasonablevj ! 1.
parameter values.
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B. Biases Caused by Model Misspecification
We are not the first to point out that the labor supply function must
be augmented to account for the marginal effect of work hours on wages.8
However, we believe that we are the first to show analytically why failure
to account for tied wage-hours offers will produce labor supply elasticities
that are smaller than the elasticity of interest. We describe the difference
below.
Wage changes affect hours changes in the following way:
d log h d loglit it
p j 1 . (9)( )d log W d log Wit it
Assuming 9 the labor supply response to the(d logl )/(d log W )p 0,it it
wage change is
d log hit
p j. (10)Fd log Wit l it
Therefore, is an unbiased estimator of 10(d log h /d log W )F j.it it l it
However, the parameter j is no longer of interest if wages are tied to
hours worked. Macroeconomists are interested in the co-movement of
hours and technology, Tax analysts are interested in the effectd log h /da .it it
of taxes on labor supply, The labor supply re-d log h /[d log (1 t )].it t
sponse to both technology changes and tax changes is the same. For
convenience, we consider the effect of a tax change on a change in hours:
d log h d log h d loglit it it
p j 1 v  . (11)( )d log (1 t ) d log (1 t ) d log (1 t )t t t
8 Rosen (1976), Moffitt (1984), and Lundberg (1985) point out the same problem
in static labor supply models.
9 The labor supply elasticity holding the marginal utility of wealth constant, or
the Frisch elasticity, is the usual object of interest in intertemporal labor supply
studies. Changes in the marginal utility of wealth are potentially correlated with
wage changes. Assuming away precautionary behavior and potential liquidity con-
straints, Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985) and MaCurdy (1985) both show that
anticipated wage changes should not be correlated with the marginal utility of wealth.
10 This result relies on the assumption that the log wage increases linearly in log
hours. However, Barzel (1973) speculates that, at very long work weeks, an increase
in hours might lower wages as exhaustion reduces productivity, and so
In an earlier version of this article, we showed that′′w (logh ) ! 0.it
is a downward biased estimator of j if Nev-′′(d log h )/(d log W )F w (logh ) ! 0.it it l itit
ertheless, the existence of tied-wage hours offers need not necessarily lead to in-
consistent estimates of It is nonlinearity in the wage-hours relationship that causesj.
inconsistent estimates of j.
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There are three objects on the right-hand side of equation (11), reflecting
three different labor supply incentives from a tax change. The first term
arises from changes in the post-tax wage, holding the pre-tax wage fixed.
A reduction in taxes causes an increase in the post-tax wage, which, in
turn, affects labor supply. This is the usual object of interest in intertem-
poral labor supply studies. The second term arises from the effect of hours
worked on the wage. If reductions in taxes cause increases in hoursj 1 0,
worked, which, in turn, increases the pre-tax wage (because of tied wage-
hours offers). Because the pre-tax wage increases, hours worked increases
further. The final term is the effect of the tax change on the marginal
utility of wealth. Assuming that we can re-d logl /[d log (1 t )]p 0,it t
arrange equation (11) as
d log h jit
p . (12)Fd log (1 t ) 1 jvt l it
Comparing equations (10) and (12) shows that the labor supply response
to a 1% increase in is larger than the labor supply response to a1 tt
1% wage increase.
This result is important for two reasons. First, the empirical strategy
for estimating labor supply elasticities becomes material. Specifically, stud-
ies that use tax changes (e.g., Eissa and Liebman 1996) to proxy for wage
changes should find larger labor supply elasticities than studies that use
wage changes (e.g., MaCurdy 1981; Browning et al. 1985; Altonji 1986)
if wages depend on hours worked. Second, analysts who use labor supply
elasticities are usually interested in the labor supply response to tax and
technology changes. Labor supply elasticity estimates obtained using wage
changes will be smaller than the elasticity of interest.
III. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is fairly transparent from figure 1. The top panel
reports the change in the average number of hours worked for all working
men in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Health and
Retirement Survey (HRS), and the March supplement and Outgoing Ro-
tation Groups (ORG) of the Current Population Survey. These profiles
are constructed using fixed-effects estimators and are computed from
samples of workers age 50–70. The next section describes the data and
sample restrictions in more detail.
The number of hours worked slowly begin to decline around age 55,
but the biggest drops occur after age 61. For example, among PSID work-
ers between the ages of 61 and 62, annual work hours decline 10%. Hours
continue to fall at ages 63 and 64, before another large 10% drop at 65.
After age 65, hours declines are smaller in magnitude, although sample
sizes are so small that wage growth is not reliably estimated. Big drops
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Fig. 1.—Hours and wage growth
after age 61, particularly at ages 62 and 65, are observed in the other three
data sets as well.11
The bottom panel of figure 1 displays average wage growth for the
same male workers. Wages remain relatively flat, with perhaps some mod-
est overall decline, between ages 50 and 61. But at age 62 the average wage
among PSID workers drops by 4.5%. This decline continues from ages
63 through 66, with the biggest drop, 6.5%, occurring at 65. Again, these
patterns are relatively consistent with those observed for the other data
sets.
Taken together, the two panels in figure 1 suggest a possible causal
11 The ORG shows a less severe drop in hours at ages 62 and 65 because the
ORG measures changes in the work week. The other three surveys measure changes
in the work year, thus accounting for both changes in the number of weeks worked
and changes in the average work week.
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relationship between hours and wages. The biggest drop in wages occurs
at 62 and 65, the same ages at which the social security work disincentives
begin. This suggests to us that turning age 62 and 65 are possible instru-
mental variables that can be used to identify the part-time/full-time wage
differential.
In order to estimate a part-time differential, we use a standard instru-
mental variables model that allows for individual-specific fixed effects:
K
klog h p f  g age  g I{age ≥ 62} g I{age ≥ 65} e , (13)it i k it 62 it 65 it it
kp1
K
k ̂log w p z  d age  vlog h  u , (14)it i k it it it
kp1
where is the predicted hours level for the ith individual at time t,̂log hit
using equation (13); is the individual’s age; andage I{age ≥ 62}it it
are 0-1 indicators equal to one when the individual is moreI{age ≥ 65}it
than 62 and 65 years old and zero otherwise; and are individual-f zi i
specific fixed effects; and the error terms and are white noise.12 Notee uit it
that we prefer to use hours worked, rather than a part-time indicator, to
avoid concerns about the ad hoc nature of a part-time/full-time threshold
and because we believe that the hours measure allows us to exploit more
12 The functional forms in eqq. (13) and (14) are consistent with the model de-
scribed in Sec. II under the following assumptions:
K
ka p z  d age  u ,it i k it it
kp1
K
klog (1 t )p f  f age f I{age ≥ 62}f I{age ≥ 65},t 0 k it 62 it 65 it
kp1
K
k p q q age w ,it i0 k it it
kp1
where and are white noise. The parameters in eq. (13) have the followingu wit it
interpretation:
g p j{d f  log [b(1 r)]}q ,1 1 1 1
g p j(d f )q , kp 2, … ,K,k k k k
g p jf ,62 62
g p jf ,65 65
f p j[vf  z  logl ]qi 0 i i0 i0,
e p j[u  (logl  log E l )]w ,it it it 0 it it
where follows a random walk with drift term (MaCurdy 1985). Thelogl b(1 r)it
drift term is captured in .g1
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informative variation.13 However, a continuous measure of hours may
introduce measurement error that biases downward our part-time wage
estimate. This is a particular problem in cases where we estimate equation
(13) in differenced form. Therefore, we present results that use both hours
worked and the part-time dummy. In light of Hotchkiss (1991) and Er-
misch and Wright (1993), we use part-time/full-time hours thresholds
ranging from 30 to 38 hours per week.
Another noteworthy part of the estimating equations is the fixed-effect
term. If there is an unobserved quality difference between part-time and
full-time workers, cross-sectional studies of the part-time wage effect will
be biased, as the part-time dummy will proxy for latent worker quality.
Failure to account for the fixed effect will lead to an omitted variables
bias in the cross section. Nevertheless, most studies of the part-time wage
effect that we are aware of have been estimated on cross-sectional
samples.14
Note that, because the fixed-effect model is identified from wage
changes, composition bias problems (i.e., the question of whether high-
wage or low-wage individuals become part-time workers) are addressed
if wage growth is the same for workers and nonworkers. However, if
individuals leave the market because of a sudden wage drop, such as from
job loss, we will not be able to include the new potential wage of those
individuals. This problem will bias wage growth upward. Because more
individuals drop out of the labor force at ages 62 and 65 than at other
ages, this upward bias should be more severe at these ages. Therefore, the
wage declines depicted in figure 1 understate the true wage declines at
these ages, and our estimate of the part-time wage effect could be biased
toward zero.
Because of the fixed effect, the specification of equations (13) and (14)
is parsimonious, reflecting only essential time-varying confounding fac-
tors. One such factor is the natural aging process. Human capital theory
posits that, near the end of the life cycle, workers should invest less in
skill development as they have fewer years left in the labor market to
recoup the investment. Therefore, wages should decline as remaining skills
decline in value. Declining wages at the end of the life cycle potentially
13 Hotchkiss (1991) estimates this threshold within a switching model with sample
selection. She finds that the proper average hours cutoff is significantly higher,
around 38 hours, than the standard 35-hour work week, and that this cutoff varies
across industry. The survey used in Ermisch and Wright (1993) reports the woman’s
own definition of part-time. With the exception of teachers, most women’s definition
of part-time corresponds to less than 30 hours per work week.
14 For example, Rosen (1976), Simpson (1986), Blank (1990), and Hotchkiss (1991).
Ermisch and Wright (1993) use a cross-section that includes recall of work history.
However, longitudinal analyses are presented in Lundberg (1985), Blank (1998), and
Hirsch (2001).
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induces declining hours worked at the end of the life cycle (Heckman
1976).
To solve this problem, we assume that productivity declines smoothly
with age, and so the effects of declining productivity and the declines in
hours that result from declining productivity can be captured by a fourth
order age polynomial. We use indicators for ages greater than 62 and
greater than 65 to capture the effects of the social security system on
hours and wages. These variables should capture the change in hours and
wages at the exact ages of 62 and 65.
Other potential problems with our estimation strategy are discussed in
the results section.
IV. Data
We use four data sets of workers in their fifties or sixties—the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the outgoing rotation (ORG) of the
Current Population Survey (CPS), the March supplement of the CPS,
and the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)—to deal with our concerns.
Each data set has particular strengths for our purpose.
The long panel structure of the PSID is particularly useful for account-
ing for individual-specific attributes that might influence wages. However,
the number of workers older than 61 is limited. Between 1968 and 1997,
we have 11,493 person-year observations on 1,436 separate men and 4,816
person-year observations on 685 separate women. At age 62, we observe
468 men working and 163 women working. At age 65, we observe 245
men working and 76 women working. Our PSID sample, unlike those
from the other surveys, does not include nonmarried women but does
include nonmarried men.
Alternatively, the HRS has been following an older cohort, those age
51 to 61 in 1992, for close to a decade. After five waves of data, the last
in 2000, the full panel includes 9,545 worker-year observations on 2,945
men and 9,725 worker-year observations on 2,912 women. The oldest
cohort is 69 in 2000, but many of the respondents are still younger than
62 in the latest waves. Furthermore, since the survey occurs every other
year, respondents’ labor market activity is observed at age 62 or 65 but
not both. Therefore, we only have 766 and 329 workers at ages 62 and
65, respectively. However, the detail of the questions about work and
retirement far exceeds those in the PSID.
To alleviate concerns about sample size, we used the CPS. In particular,
we report results from two samples of CPS workers—those that are in
the March supplements and those in the outgoing rotation groups (ORG).
The CPS respondents follow a specific sampling time frame; they are
surveyed for 4 months, are off for 8 months, and then are interviewed
again for 4 months. Starting in 1979, respondents are in the ORG during
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the last month of each 4-month cycle. This means that all CPS respondents
have two observations in the ORG, spaced 1 year apart. Since there are
only two observations per person, rather than add a person-specific fixed
effect to the statistical model, we work in first differences. Regardless,
the ORG samples far exceed those from the PSID or HRS. We are able
to match over 193,000 workers age 50–70 between 1980 and 1999, of
which 7,244 are age 62 and 3,455 are age 65 during the sampling frame.
The drawback to the ORG is its limited range of questions. For example,
we have no information about job tenure or benefits.
A convenient compromise between the survey breadth of the HRS and
the sample sizes of the ORG is the March supplement of the CPS. The
March surveys include a series of questions about job characteristics,
including the existence of pension plans and employer-provided health
insurance. It also includes a question about how many employers the
respondent has had over the last year, which allows us to denote job
switchers and job stayers. Sample sizes are larger than those found in the
PSID and HRS but are smaller than the ORG. Roughly 87,000 workers
age 50–70 are included in the matched March samples between 1979 and
1999, of which 3,570 are age 62 and 1,841 are age 65.15 Like the ORG,
we are restricted to only two observations per person. However, an im-
portant distinction between the two CPS surveys is that the ORG asks
about labor market activity last week, while the March supplement de-
scribes wages and hours over the previous calendar year. These distinc-
tions, as we shall see, can lead to different inferences.
To account for the life-cycle wage profile, all samples are restricted to
workers between the ages of 50 and 70. A worker-year is included if an
individual toils between 10 and 89 hours per week (or 500–4,500 hours
per year) and has a real wage between $3 and $100.16 These restrictions
result in the loss of 11%, 45%, 13%, and 5% of workers age 50–70 in
our PSID, HRS, March CPS, and ORG samples, respectively.17
The appendix reports descriptive statistics for the key variables in our
analysis. Means in the PSID, particularly for the real hourly wage, are
15 However, the 1985-86 and 1995-96 March files cannot be matched. See app. S
of Unicon Research Corporation (1999).
16 In the CPS, we also discard workers with more than a 400% wage change
across years. This affects a small minority of respondents and has very little impact
on the results.
17 The difference between samples that exclude 4% or 5% vs. over 10% is due
to when part-year workers (who work over 10 hours per week) are dropped. For
work-related questions based on last week’s activity (ORG and HRS), many part-
year workers are excluded since they would have zero hours at the survey date.
For questions based on last year’s activity (March CPS and PSID), we drop workers
who work fewer than 500 hours per year. Therefore, part-year workers in the March
CPS and PSID might be excluded due to our hours restrictions.
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different from those of the other surveys because of the greater com-
position of men.
V. Results
Table 1 reports the basic instrumental variables results. Each panel dis-
plays the first-stage estimates for the age 62 and age 65 instruments (g62
and in eq. [13]) and the second-stage (eq. [14]) parameter of interest, v,g65
the part-time wage effect. All regressions also include a fourth-order age
polynomial and year or survey dummies.18 The results are reported sepa-
rately for men and women. The top panel reports findings when is ahit
continuous measure of hours. Alternatively, the bottom panel shows how
robust these results are to a commonly used discrete measure of part-time
status, whether the individual worked more than 35 hours per week or
1,750 hours per year.19 All standard errors are Huber-White and corrected
to account for multiple observations within individuals.
As already shown in figure 1, table 1 shows the high degree of asso-
ciation between the age 62 and age 65 indicators and our measures of
hours worked. For men, hours drop at least an additional 2% per year,
and in some instances as much as 10%, at these older ages, relative to
what is expected based on the fourth-order age polynomial. Furthermore,
t-statistics usually exceed 3 for each of the age instruments, suggesting
that these drops are not only economically but also statistically important.
For women, the change in hours at ages 62 and 65 is not as striking. With
the exception of the PSID, hours drop by roughly 1%–2% above what
would be expected by the age polynomial, with mixed statistical
importance.
The row labeled “predicted hours change” shows our estimate of the
causal impact of hours on wages. For men, the point estimates are fairly
stable across three of the four data sets, clustered tightly between 0.40
and 0.50 for all but the ORG and statistically significant at the 10% level
for all but the HRS. Furthermore, when using the discrete hours threshold,
the results remain relatively similar and, in all cases, are different from
zero at standard significance levels.20
However, for women, the evidence is less clear. Part-time coefficients
are statistically significant only when using the ORG, suggesting that the
causal impact of hours on wages for female workers is quite weak. While
18 Both the Schwarz and Akaike information criterion, described in Judge et al.
(1985), suggest either a second- or a third-order polynomial.
19 The results are not sensitive to using other reasonable cutoffs, such as 30 or 38
hours per week.
20 When we estimate the wage-hours relationship with fixed effects using OLS,
the point estimates are of the wrong sign and statistically significant. This is not a
surprise, as a number of studies have found that OLS is biased downward in the
presence of measurement error. We discuss this issue in more detail below.
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Table 1
Basic Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variables Estimates
PSID HRS CPS March CPS ORG
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
A. Using continuous hours measure:
First stage—point estimates for instruments used in
hours regression:
Worker is age 62 .082 .046 .043 .041 .035 .015 .021 .023
(.021) (.033) (.015) (.015) (.007) (.009) (.004) (.005)
Worker is age 65 .097 .082 .076 .002 .055 .026 .027 .014
(.031) (.046) (.026) (.029) (.010) (.012) (.006) (.007)
Second stage—hours effect from wage regression (v): .517 .863 .371 .024 .424 .176 .949 .663
(.304) (.748) (.313) (.315) (.224) (.492) (.362) (.386)
B. Using part-time dummy (35–hour work week
cutoff):
First stage—point estimates for instruments used in
hours regression:
Worker is age 62 .066 .051 .030 .044 .052 .013 .018 .027
(.025) (.039) (.019) (.021) (.009) (.012) (.007) (.008)
Worker is age 65 .095 .101 .077 .021 .097 .061 -.033 .034
(.035) (.049) (.030) (.038) (.012) (.016) (.009) (.011)
Second stage—hours effect from wage regression (v): .612 .678 .498 -.012 .282 .007 1.127 .691
(.369) (.606) (.357) (.280) (.130) (.239) (.429) (.306)
Sample size 11,493 4,816 9,545 9,725 49,590 37,618 104,485 89,200
Note.—Regressions include a fourth-order age polynomial and year or survey dummies. Part-time threshold is based on a 35-hour, 50-week work year.
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the PSID estimate is large, precision is poor. Combined with the non-
existent effects arising from the HRS and CPS March data, we conclude
that there is little evidence for a causal impact of hours on wages for
women, given the available data.
It is interesting to note that the ORG appears to be an outlier among
both genders. We believe that this is due to differences in the period being
examined. In the ORG, respondents are asked about work activity in the
last week. For the other three surveys, respondents are asked about their
experience in the last year.21 Rosen (1976) also finds a larger effect when
using hours last week than when using hours last year. He speculates that
many individuals working fewer than 1,750 hours per year are not part-
time workers but rather full-time workers who are only working part of
the year. Therefore, “part-time” workers using the last year measure are
actually a mixture of part-time and full-time workers using the last week
measure. An alternative explanation is that the last year query could bias
our results toward zero since the survey mixes hours and wage measures
across ages (e.g., the age 62 indicator is actually a combination of a year
when the respondent is 61 and 62). In fact, when we run the March CPS
regressions but use respondents in the outgoing rotation months (thus
allowing us to use the last week variables), the point estimates are very
similar to those reported for the ORG, albeit with much less precision.
We take this as evidence that the 0.4 estimates for men are perhaps a lower
bound of the true relationship between hours and wages.
We also attempted two variations on the instrument choice. First, we
added an interaction between age 65 and whether the individual had em-
ployer-provided health insurance at age 64. Many individuals with em-
ployer-provided health insurance will lose their health insurance if they
leave their job or cut their work hours. Upon eligibility for medicare at
age 65, an individual’s health insurance is no longer tied to full-time job
status. Therefore, this interaction takes advantage of variation in hours
associated with the advent of medicare at age 65 for those who rely on
employer-provided health insurance prior to 65. However, the presence
of employer-provided health insurance could be a proxy for the quality
of a job and therefore be an invalid instrument. Nevertheless, the results
are virtually identical to those reported in table 1. Second, we interact the
age instruments with indicators for changes in the social security earnings
test in 1990 and 1996. These specifications were run on the CPS, the only
data set that had sufficient samples during the different policy years. But
again, the results were virtually identical to those reported in table 1.
Still, there may be alternative explanations for why wages decline at
ages 62 and 65. First, within a job, the work week is often fixed. Therefore,
21 The HRS hours measure is hours worked last week multiplied by weeks usually
worked per year.
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much of the variation used to identify hours changes could come from
job switchers. Ruhm (1990) finds that many older workers switch to part-
time bridge jobs, potentially in a different industry than their career job.
Therefore, wage changes could be due to productivity changes that may
result from the loss of industry-, firm-, or job-specific human capital.
We address this issue by restricting the sample to workers who have
not switched employers in the last year.22 Therefore, identification is based
on within-employer variation in hours worked. For the CPS, this meant
throwing out any worker-year observation that involved an employer
change.23 For the HRS and PSID, we control for employer changes by
including a full set of employer dummy variables that separately identifies
hours and wages changes that are coming from employer switches and
from nonswitches.24
Table 2 reports the results of such an exercise using the men from the
PSID, HRS, and March CPS. The results generally confirm our earlier
findings. When we limit identification to men who stay at their employers,
point estimates remain in the 0.40 range, relatively similar to those re-
ported in table 1. Given the smaller sample sizes, standard errors rise,
causing statistical significance to be severely affected in some cases. But,
given how stable our estimates appear to be across data sets, we believe
that larger samples would show that the part-time effect survives this test.
Alternatively, we can control for changes in industry and occupation
to account for any loss of firm- and industry-specific human capital. While
this is a less satisfactory way to deal with this problem, it is another
robustness check of the importance of latent changes in a worker’s en-
dowments. The results appear robust to such controls. For example, rees-
22 The March CPS supplement asks respondents to self-report how many em-
ployers they had during the previous year, where multiple part-time employers are
counted as one employer. We define an employer switch as having more than one
employer over the year. The HRS definition is based on a similar question. The
PSID asks how long the individual has been with the current employer. If the
individual has been with that employer less than 1 year, we consider him or her to
have taken a new employer.
23 This could result in not enough variation to identify the part-time effect. If this
were the case, standard errors would blow up. However, while the amount of hours
variation within employers is obviously smaller, it is hardly inconsequential. Among
male CPS respondents between ages 50 and 70, the mean log change in annual hours
worked for employer stayers and employer switchers is0.018 and0.075. Among
62- and 65-year-olds, the mean hours change for an employer stayer is roughly half
of that for an employer changer.
24 An alternative strategy is to analyze a group of workers who were displaced
involuntarily at older ages and returned to the labor market. Any wage loss that
might result from another employer switch would likely have occurred after their
initial displacement. However, displacement rates for older workers are low, and
those that are displaced often do not return to the labor force. Therefore, such an
analysis is not feasible on standard data sets, such as the Displaced Worker Survey.
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Table 2
Robustness Checks: Males Only
Employer Stayers Only
Workers without
Pensions
Employer Stayers
without Pensions
PSID HRS March CPS HRS March CPS HRS March CPS
A. Using continuous hours measure:
First stage—point estimates for instruments used in
hours regression:
Worker is age 62 .073 .042 .034 .048 .029 .048 .024
(.025) (.015) (.007) (.022) (.015) (.022) (.015)
Worker is age 65 .058 .070 .046 .092 .040 .094 .036
(.043) (.028) (.010) (.033) (.019) (.033) (.019)
Second stage—hours effect from wage regression (v): .314 .401 .413 .235 .972 .246 1.205
(.340) (.336) (.254) (.341) (.640) (.336) (.813)
B. Using part-time dummy (35-hour work week
cutoff):
First stage—point estimates for instruments used in
hours regression:
Worker is age 62 .082 .029 .048 .051 .060 .051 .057
(.032) (.019) (.009) (.028) (.018) (.028) (.018)
Worker is age 65 .080 .073 .088 .091 .069 .092 .075
(.054) (.031) (.013) (.036) (.023) (.040) (.023)
Second stage—hours effect from wage regression (v): .372 .490 .298 .219 .470 .231 .518
(.315) (.374) (.148) (.333) (.289) (.329) (.294)
Sample size 6,961 9,234 46,625 4,775 16,160 4,775 14,794
Note.—Regressions include a fourth-order age polynomial and year or survey dummies. Part-time threshold is based on a 35-hour, 50-week work year.
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timating the CPS outgoing rotation group regressions for men but in-
cluding controls for changes in occupation and industry alters our point
estimates (and standard errors) from 0.95 (0.36) to 0.85 (0.39). Likewise,
among CPS March respondents, occupation and industry controls change
our estimates from 0.42 (0.22) to 0.48 (0.22). Stratifying the sample to
exclude industry and occupation switchers also has no discernible effect.
A second concern about the estimation procedure is that firms may
structure their compensation and pension plans in order to encourage
workers to leave by age 62 or 65. Lazear (1981) implies that employers
offer below-productivity compensation when a worker is young but re-
ward him or her with above-productivity compensation at the end of his
or her career. This large payday when old motivates young workers to
work hard. However, this scheme potentially causes the worker to remain
with the firm longer than is optimal. In order to induce the worker to
leave, firms often offer low pension accrual to employees in their sixties
(Gustman et al. 1998). This induces workers to leave their old, high-wage
job for new jobs with potentially lower wages. Therefore, there may be
a drop in wages at ages 62 and 65 because workers are moving to jobs
with lower wages, not because they are working fewer hours.
To sidestep this problem, we look at samples of workers who do not
have pension plans. Moreover, our results on workers who remain at the
same firm should inform us about the severity of this problem. The second
panel of columns in table 2 shows the results on a restricted sample of
male workers without pension plans. With the HRS, we restrict the sample
to those without defined benefit plans. For the March CPS, we restrict
the sample to those without any pension plan. Naturally, this increases
the standard errors. Still our inferences, while less assured, are similar in
nature. The final panel of columns in table 2 combines the job stayers
and pension restrictions. Again, although precision is hampered by the
small sample size, we see little reason to recast inferences based on these
results. Clearly, we are less confident of our findings, but this is likely
due to a lack of older workers who are not switching jobs and do not
have pension plans rather than any instability in the parameter estimates.
A third consideration is the presence of measurement error. Because
variation in measured hours and wage changes is dominated by mea-
surement error (Altonji 1986; Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz 2001),
measurement error is of particular concern in studies of the interrelation
between hours and wages. This problem is especially severe because the
wage is constructed by dividing earnings by hours, meaning that mea-
surement error in wages and hours is negatively correlated by construc-
tion. This causes the OLS estimate to be biased downward, and is a similar
problem to the “division bias” problem in the labor supply literature.
Because we use age to instrument for wage and hours changes, our in-
strument should be uncorrelated with measurement error in hours and
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wage changes at the population level. Although age is uncorrelated with
measurement error at the population level, age will in general be correlated
with measurement error in the small sample (Nelson and Startz 1990;
Staiger and Stock 1997).
To address the small sample bias problem, we vary our sample sizes
and reestimate the part-time wage effect on the smaller sample using a
“jackknife” procedure (Efron 1982). If the small sample bias problem is
unimportant, then reducing the sample size should make our estimates
less precise, but it should not affect the point estimates in any predictable
way. However, if small sample bias is important, reducing the sample size
should bias results toward the OLS estimate (Nelson and Startz 1990).
We ran our two-stage regressions 1,000 times each on random samples
of 10,000, 20,000, and 30,000 March CPS men between the ages of 50
and 70. Over the 1,000 repetitions, a random sample of 10,000 men results
in a part-time penalty point estimate that averages 0.41 but has a standard
deviation around that average of 1.09. The impact of doubling the sample
to 20,000 is to alter the point estimates ever so slightly, to 0.43, but
substantially reduce the standard deviation around the point estimate to
0.33. Finally, when the sample is raised to 30,000 men, the average co-
efficient is again barely affected (0.43), but the standard deviation drops
to 0.20. This pattern is consistent with that seen across data sets with
varying sample sizes, as well as the sample restrictions reported in table
2. Point estimates remain remarkably stable, although precision can be
seriously hindered by small samples, suggesting that small sample bias is
relatively unimportant.
A final concern is that compensation packages change with age. At
older ages, workers may demand nonpecuniary benefits at the cost of
lower wages. While it is important to note that one of these key benefits,
reduced hours, is precisely the parameter that we are trying to identify,
other forms of compensation are not included in our wage measure.
We attempt to control for this problem by inferring the value of em-
ployer-provided health insurance and pensions using the March CPS and
HRS, the only two data sets that have information on whether respondents
earn these benefits.25 Since these data sets do not report the dollar value
of benefits, we infer their value using average employer-paid health plan
costs reported in EBRI (1999, tables 3.3 and 4.2) and age-specific pension
25 According to the the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s annual Employer Costs for
Employee Compensation release, our measure of wages, which should include paid
leave and bonuses, makes up 82% of total compensation. Health insurance and
retirement savings encompass another 6% and 3.5%, respectively. The remaining
8.5% of compensation consists almost entirely of legally required benefits that
should not vary much in our sample.
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Table 3
Basic Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variables Estimates, Using Compensation
Measures: Males Only
HRS March CPS
A. Using continuous hours measure, second stage,
hours effect from wage regression (v) .533
(.337)
.421
(.222)
B. Using part-time dummy (35-hour work week cutoff),
second stage, hours effect from wage regression (v) .725
(.424)
.311
(.137)
Sample size 8,235 39,647
Note.—Compensation includes wages, pensions, and health insurance. See the text for details.
accrual values from Gustman et al. (1998).26 Table 3 reports results using
this more complete compensation measure. For both the CPS and HRS,
the results are similar to those reported in table 1. Using the hours mea-
sure, elasticity point estimates continue to be around 0.40. Therefore, we
believe that offsetting nonwage compensation is unlikely to be signifi-
cantly biasing our results.
Furthermore, while changes in other latent nonmonetary benefits, such
as a less stressful workplace or more flexible schedule, are potentially
problematic, many of our results suggest that this is unlikely to explain
the main results. First, inclusion of an age polynomial will account for
compensation mix choices that change smoothly with age. While it is still
plausible that there are discrete changes in nonpecuniary benefits at ages
62 and 65, we believe that our specification somewhat limits this concern.
Second, including industry and occupation dummies, which made very
little difference to our results, may eliminate obvious career changes that
would be consistent with the nonpecuniary benefits story. Finally, our
results are robust to restricting the sample to job stayers. Again, this does
not eliminate the possibility that workers are trading wages for nonpe-
cuniary benefits even within firms, but the robustness of the results to
these checks suggests to us that our results are consistent with the existence
of a part-time wage penalty for older men.
VI. Conclusion
This article assesses the impact of wage-hours ties on intertemporal
labor supply elasticity. We present new empirical evidence on wage-hours
ties among older workers that takes advantage of the work disincentives
of the social security system. Using this identification strategy, we find
evidence that male part-time workers earn lower wages than male full-
26 Because we lack data on employer-provided health plan costs by demographic
group, each person with a plan is assigned the average cost, as computed by the
Employee Benefit Research Instititute (EBRI). However, pension values are age-
specific.
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Table 4
The Labor Supply Response to a Change in Taxes under
Different Assumptions about the Labor Supply Responses to a
Change in Wages and the Tied Wage-Hours Effect
Labor Supply
Response to
Change in Wage
(d log h /d log W )it it
Tied Wage-Hours Effect (v)
0 .2 .4 .6
0 0 0 0 0
.5 .5 .56 .63 .71
1 1 1.25 1.67 2.5
1.5 1.5 2.14 3.76 15
Note.—Value of
d logh 1it
p .Fd log(1 t ) [1 v(d logh /d logW )F ]lt it it lit it
time workers, although there is little evidence of such an effect among
women. Depending on the specification and the data employed, our es-
timates imply that cutting older mens’ hours from 40 to 20 hours per
week lowers wages by up to 25%.
Not accounting for such a relationship leads to an underestimate of the
effect of tax changes on the posttax wage and consequently labor supply.
Table 4 quantifies this effect. In particular, equation (12) shows the re-
lationship between the labor supply response to changes in taxes (or
equivalently, technology), the labor supply re-[d log h /d log (1 t )]F ,it t l it
sponse to changes in the wage, and the tied(d log h /d log W )F p j,it it l it
wage-hours coefficient Recall that most studies measurev.
and find the variable to be usually between 0 and(d log h /d log W )Fit it l it
0.5 for continuously employed men but often greater than 1 for women
(e.g., Heckman and MaCurdy 1980). Most of our estimates of the tied
wage-hours coefficient v are in the neighborhood of 0.4. Assuming that
and equation (12) shows that the labor(d log h /d log W )F p .5 vp .4,it it l it
supply response to a technology change is 26% greater (0.5 vs. 0.63) than
the labor supply response to a wage change for men. However, using an
estimate of the wage elasticity of 1 for women, the difference could be
substantial, perhaps a 67% difference (1 vs. 1.67), although it is important
to note that we find very weak evidence of any wage-hours tie for women.
Of course, our estimates are based on older cohorts of workers and there-
fore may not be representative of a wage-hours tie for prime-age workers.
Nevertheless, if older workers are representative of the population, it
suggests that the interrelationship between hours and the wage is eco-
nomically important to labor supply estimation.
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Appendix
Table A1
Descriptive Statistics
PSID HRS
CPS
March ORG
Hours (average):
Ages 50–70 1,941 1,981 2,000 39.4
Age 62 1,835 1,842 1,896 38.0
Age 65 1,611 1,625 1,738 35.0
Part-time dummy (average):
Ages 50–70 .303 .199 .205 .205
Age 62 .372 .282 .280 .245
Age 65 .560 .398 .412 .377
Real hourly wage (average in 1996 dollars):
Ages 50–70 17.26 16.07 16.08 14.93
Age 62 16.55 15.26 15.29 14.39
Age 65 15.26 13.46 14.74 12.64
Male (average):
Ages 50-70 .705 .516 .568 .543
Age 62 .741 .535 .576 .536
Age 65 .704 .567 .557 .528
Sample size:
Ages 50–70 16,309 19,270 87,208 193,685
Age 62 631 766 3,570 7,244
Age 65 321 329 1,841 3,455
Years covered 1969–96 1992–2000 1979–99 1979–99
Note.—Hours are an annual measure for the PSID, HRS, and March CPS and a weekly measure for the
ORG. For the part-time threshold, the annual measure is based on less than 1,750 hours and the weekly
measure on less than 35 hours.
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